Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation provides insurance against external shocks and yields a more informative measure of CEO actions. I argue that empirical evidence on the use of RPE is mixed because previous studies rely on a misspecified peer group. External shocks and flexibility in responding to the shocks are functions of, for example, the firm's technology, the complexity of the organization, and the ability to access external credit, which depend on firm size. When peers are composed of similar industry-size firms, evidence is consistent with the use of RPE in CEO compensation.
Introduction
Agency theory suggests that the compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) should be linked to firm performance to motivate CEOs to maximize shareholder value. Further, the hypothesis of relative performance evaluation (RPE) (Holmstrom, 1982; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) states that the firm performance measure used in CEO pay should exclude the component driven by exogenous shocks. Despite much research in this area, the lack of consistent empirical evidence supporting the use of RPE in CEO compensation is an important unresolved puzzle (Murphy, 1999; Abowd and Kaplan, 1999; Prendergast, 1999) .
In this paper, I study how the choice of peer group affects tests of RPE, which is a joint test of how incentives are granted and of what constitutes a peer group. Previous tests potentially lack power to detect evidence that supports RPE because peer groups chosen by researchers are incorrect. The challenge in choosing a RPE peer group is to identify the set of firms that are exposed to common shocks and share a common ability to respond to those shocks.
Suppose, as many studies of RPE do, that firms' external shocks are best described by economy-wide shocks. Then the relevant group of peers are the Standard & Poor's 500 firms or the firms in some other market index (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Garvey and Milbourn, 2003) . However, if external shocks are mostly dominated by industry-specific shocks, the S&P 500 is not an appropriate peer group. Studies have also tested RPE using industry peers (e.g., Antle and Smith, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Janakiraman et al., 1992; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a, b) . However, if common external shocks affect some firms in the industry negatively and others positively, then average industry performance fails to capture the external shock. For example, Thomas (1990) Evidence from data sets other than ExecuComp. Regressing total compensation on both accounting and stock returns, Antle and Smith (1986) find support for RPE in only 16 out of 39 firms. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) find evidence supporting RPE using stock returns as the performance measure in the compensation contract. They find that changes in CEO pay are more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to the firm's industry.
1 Using the same sample as Gibbons and Murphy, but different compensation and performance measures, Jensen and Murphy (1990) do not find evidence supporting RPE. 2 Janakiraman et al. (1992) present evidence of RPE in stock returns but reject that RPE usage amounts to the theoretical value in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) (see also Section 5.4). Their results contrast with those in this paper as I do not find that changes in CEO pay are correlated with the performance of peer firms in the same industry but instead are correlated with the performance of those firms in the same industry and size group. Barro and Barro (1990) study the largest US commercial banks and find that CEOs are compensated based on average regional bank performance, contradicting RPE. Finally, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue that CEOs are rewarded for luck, i.e., changes in firm performance that are beyond the CEO's control (see also Garvey and Milbourn, 2006) . Their findings suggest that pay for luck is more relevant for poorly governed firms. Evidence from ExecuComp. Recent studies using the ExecuComp data generally find results inconsistent with RPE. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) present evidence in favor of RPE when compensation is defined in levels and the model is estimated using ordinary least squares with CEO-fixed effects, but no evidence when using changes in compensation. Garvey and Milbourn (2003) model and test whether RPE usage in stock returns varies with the level of CEO wealth diversification. Using a market-wide peer performance measure, they find evidence of RPE for younger and less wealthy managers, but no evidence for the average firm.
The mixed evidence with regard to RPE in stock returns for the average CEO has given rise to a new branch of RPE literature. In this new branch, researchers explore whether the use of RPE varies cross sectionally across industry, firm, or CEO characteristics. As the focus of my paper is on whether RPE is used on average in setting CEO pay, I only briefly describe this other branch of the RPE literature. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) show that RPE is used less in more concentrated industries. Using a sample of Japanese firms, Joh (1999) reports that firms collude in their product market decisions and are thus compensated positively for industry performance. Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000) argue that a manager's outside Gibbons and Murphy (1990) One-, two-, three-, and four-digit SIC and a market index Y Yes in RET N N oi nR O A Jensen and Two-digit SIC and a market index N Barro and Barro (1990) Banks within the same geographical region N N Janakiraman et al. (1992) Two-digit SIC Y Yes in RET N N No in change in ROE Joh (1996) Four-digit Japanese Development Bank Industry Code (2000) A market index N Garvey and Milbourn (2003) Market indexes N Garvey and Milbourn (2006) Two-digit SIC N Rajgopal et al. (2006) Two-digit SIC and a market index Y Yes only in S&P 500 firms N Panels A and B summarize the peer group and the empirical findings of implicit tests of RPE. The studies that rely on non-ExecuComp data are presented in Panel A, and the studies that use the ExecuComp data are presented in Panel B. The symbols Y and N denote whether the study shows evidence supporting or not supporting the use of RPE, respectively. RET, ROA and ROE are stock returns, accounting returns and return on equity, respectively. For the definition of weak-form and strong-form RPE tests, see Appendix A.
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1 Dye (1992) relates the choice of industry versus market-wide performance measures in the use of RPE to managerial discretion in project choice. 2 Jensen and Murphy use changes in compensation as the dependent variable and the change in shareholder wealth (stock return multiplied by beginning-of-year market value of equity), both gross and net of market performance, as performance measures. Gibbons and Murphy (1990, p. 45) mention that the different results obtained by Jensen and Murphy are mainly driven by their choice of performance measure, which ''reduces the impact of heterogeneity by firm size.'' job opportunities are a positive function of industry stock returns and that this is stronger for more talented CEOs. They find that RPE usage for smaller firms is less of a puzzle. Rajgopal et al. (2006) find that the lack of RPE is due to the fact that CEO pay varies with outside employment opportunities (as in Himmelberg and Hubbard, 2000) . Evidence from CEO turnover. Several empirical studies find that RPE is present in CEO turnover decisions, suggesting that boards rely on RPE particularly when firm performance is relatively poor.
3 I further explore whether such an asymmetry exists in CEO pay in Section 5.3. Jenter and Kanaan (2006) find evidence that CEO turnover is sensitive to poor market and industry performance contradicting RPE.
Identifying the peer group
One of the main challenges in implementing or testing RPE is to identify a firm's peer group. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Baker (2002) argue that the inability to identify an appropriate peer group can be a reason for firms not to use RPE in compensation contracts. 4 Alternatively, firms can use RPE, but researchers fail to correctly identify the firms' peers and hence fail to find evidence of RPE.
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Models of equity valuation are informative about the drivers of firm performance and can then be used as a tool to sift through performance due to CEO actions and performance due to exogenous shocks. For this purpose, I assume that, as in the dividend discount model, changes in equity value arise from shocks to earnings and from shocks to discount rates (i.e., expected equity returns).
Changes in earnings can result from either revenue or cost shocks. For example, energy price shocks are generally viewed as being outside of the CEO's control. As a common shock, energy price shocks should be filtered out, which can be done using an industry peer group. However, the extent to which energy price shocks are filtered out depends on the manager's policies, for example, the financial hedging policy, as compared with the policies of the average peer firm (the average peer performance is used to insulate CEO pay from external shocks). These policies can also be constrained by the manager's cost to respond to shocks. For example, a manager of a firm without a risk management department can find it more costly to systematically hedge energy price shocks, whereas CEOs with risk management departments in operation are likely to have a hedging policy in place. As another example, consider the CEO of a firm who is faced with a positive net present value project. A negative shock to market liquidity can force the CEO of a small firm to drop the project if he or she fails to get access to credit. In contrast, when faced with the same negative shock to market liquidity, a CEO of a larger firm can still find credit and adopt the project because he or she has access to a wider array of financing options (e.g., bank loans, private as well as public debt, domestic and international capital markets) (see Fazzari et al., 1988) . The CEO of the small firm does not invest and, as a result, equity value fails to grow not because of his actions but because of the constraints he faces. In this case, a size, and not an industry, benchmark is appropriate.
Not all industry shocks affect all firms in the industry in the same way. Thomas (1990) describes the impact of an FDA regulation requiring increased pre-market testing on pharmaceutical firms of different sizes. This regulation raised the fixed costs of producing and marketing drugs for smaller firms more than for larger firms (e.g., larger firms had greater access to the physicians and pharmacologists on the staffs of research hospitals that ultimately conducted the clinical trials necessary for regulatory approval). Thomas finds that small firms were negatively impacted by the decline in research productivity and were driven out of the market, whereas larger firms benefited from the regulation because the sales gains due to the reduced competition from smaller firms more than offset the negative impact on their own research productivity. If the average performance of the industry is not affected by the regulatory shock, then using the industry peer benchmark implies that the poor performance of small firms is incorrectly attributable to CEO actions when it was caused by an external, regulatory shock.
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In addition, different firms can face different costs in responding to the same shocks. First, firms differ in their degree of diversification. Being more diversified confers an advantage in responding to shocks not only through the use of internal capital markets but also in smoothing industry shocks that affect the firm's businesses differently. As an example, Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) show that multinational firms have managerial discretion to respond to an exchange rate shock by
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3 Examples of papers that find evidence of RPE in CEO turnover decisions are Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) , Warner et al. (1988) , Barro and Barro (1990) , Jensen and Murphy (1990) , Gibbons and Murphy (1990) , Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) , Blackwell et al. (1994), and DeFond and Park (1999) . 4 However, there is explicit evidence of RPE. Using Towers Perrin survey data for 177 large US firms in 1997, Murphy (1999) reports that 57% of financial services firms, 42% of utility firms, and 21% of industrial companies use RPE in bonus plans. Bannister et al. (2004) find that 30% of the S&P 500 firms in 1998 explicitly mention the use of RPE (see also Bannister and Newman, 2003) . Moreover, Antle and Smith (1986) argue that RPE could occur largely in the implicit features of CEO pay. 5 Parrino (1997) studies RPE in CEO turnover in the context of homogeneous industries and finds that more homogeneous industries can be expected to provide a more precise measure of shocks that need to be filtered out from firm performance. 6 Examples of the disparity of treatment of small versus large firms abound with respect to regulatory shocks. Ball and Shivakumar (2004) report that the 1981 Companies Act in the UK allowed less rigorous reporting standards for small and medium-size firms (versus large firms) as a way of protecting these firms' financial affairs from public scrutiny. Similarly, Becker and Henderson (2000) show that the implementation of the Clean Air Act was nonuniform across firms of different sizes, leading to an increased presence of smaller and less regulated firms and causing larger plants to operate at less than efficient scales. Even though nonuniformity in the application of the regulation was not intended, nonuniformity was optimal as it conserved on regulatory resources by focusing on the biggest polluters. shifting production between plants to the lowest cost producer. Second, firms differ in their degree of financing constraints. These constraints have been shown to affect the growth of firms as well as their ability to respond to shocks (e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994) . Third, firms can differ in their operating leverage. By definition the degree of operating leverage affects a firm's profit sensitivity to industry demand shocks. Consider now changes in equity value induced by changes in discount rates. French (1992, 1993) suggest that predictable changes in discount rates arise from shocks to the aggregate risk premium, shocks to firms with similar size, and shocks to firms with similar market-to-book. While shocks to the aggregate risk premium can be filtered out with industry peer performance, shocks that affect co-movement of firms with similar size or market-to-book cannot. CEOs should therefore be compensated only for actions that affect the loadings on these risk factors but not for changes on the premium associated with the risk factors.
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The previous discussion suggests that the ideal peer group should include firms that are similar along several characteristics: industry, size, diversification, financing constraints, operating leverage, and growth options. Arguably, creating such a group is not an easy task. Further, even if it were feasible, the outcome can be a peer group composed of too few firms, which can be too noisy to filter external shocks.
To reduce the dimensionality of the problem, I argue that the various firm characteristics indicated are not necessarily independent. Specifically, empirical evidence suggests that size can subsume information in many of these characteristics. For example, small firms tend to be less diversified, have greater financing constraints, and have less operating leverage. To make this point in a systematic way, I draw on existing empirical evidence and evidence from the sample of firms used in my analysis below and described in Section 4. Fig. 1 plots the mean and median levels of diversification, financing constraints, and operating leverage against size-ranked portfolios of firms. Size portfolios are constructed by ranking firms in each industry and year based on their market values of equity at the beginning of the year. Portfolio 1 (4) includes all firms in the bottom (top) quartile of market value of equity in each industry and year. 8 First, consider diversification, defined as the number of business segments in which the firm operates. Fig. 1 shows that the larger firms in each industry (portfolio 4) typically have a greater number of business segments and should thus be more diversified. Similar evidence is found in Denis et al. (1997) , though their study does not control for industry. Second, consider financing constraints constructed following the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) financing constraint index. Fig. 1 shows an inverse relation between industry-size and the level of (lagged) financing constraints. This evidence is corroborated in the existing literature. Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) find that, during a recession, small firms are more adversely affected by worsening credit conditions such as an increase in interest rates. When bank liquidity falls, banks shy away from riskier borrowers, which are typically smaller firms. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) empirically analyze the response of manufacturing firms to a tightening of monetary policy. They find that small firms contract more relative to larger firms, which can be due to financial factors. When sales decline, the presence of financial constraints limits the ability of small firms to smooth production and forces them to shed inventory. Third, consider operating leverage, defined as the percentage change in operating income for a percentage change in sales revenue (see Lev, 1974; Mandelker and Rhee, 1984) .
9 Fig. 1 shows that the larger firms in each industry tend to have higher operating leverage. 10 Finally, for growth options, the asset pricing literature suggests that co-movement of stock returns induced by size does not subsume the comovement induced by growth options. I study the construction of industry-growth options peers in detail in Section 6. For other unrelated reasons, firms of different sizes can be exposed to different shocks. For example, smaller firms are more likely to rely on fewer customers or suppliers, thereby exposing them to more firm-specific distress risk in the event that a customer or supplier defaults. Also, larger firms contract with or are scrutinized by more parties (e.g., labor unions, the government as contractor or regulator, the media), which can constrain their actions more.
In conclusion, I do not claim that firm size is the only solution to the problem of identifying RPE peers. However, firm size has important properties. It has a direct role in identifying peer firms exposed to similar shocks, is monotonically related to other firm characteristics that are also important in identifying peer firms, is readily available in contrast to measures of financing constraints, and allows for a straightforward implementation of RPE by compensation committees. The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that industry-size groups constitute better peers to benchmark CEO ARTICLE IN PRESS 7 The corporate literature that studies managerial actions takes discount rates as a given, implicitly assuming that managerial actions do not affect discount rates. 8 Constructing portfolios in this way results in a different portfolio composition than if firms were ranked by their size among all firms in each year.
This portfolio construction controls for industry effects. The distinction can result in a weaker relation between the mean (or median) firm characteristic and size, but it is required if size is to succeed in grouping firms that are subject to similar shocks in a way that is not already captured in an industry grouping. 9 The proxy for operating leverage is obtained in two steps. First, I run yearly firm-specific regressions of operating income after depreciation (DATA178) on sales (DATA12) using the last 10 years of observations. Second, I multiply the estimated firm-specific coefficients by the past 10-year mean of sales divided by the past 10-year mean of operating income to obtain the operating leverage measure. I used the lagged sensitivity of operating income to sales as a proxy for operating leverage. 10 In addition, Brickley et al. (2001) argue that a firm's organizational structure can condition the readiness with which it responds to shocks. Fig. 1 does not include any evidence regarding organizational structures for lack of an empirical measure of organizational complexity. However, Rosen (1982) argues that larger firms can suffer from a loss of control associated with deeper hierarchical organizations, which in turn implies that larger firms can be slower or less flexible in responding to shocks.
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Diversification
Operating Leverage Fig. 1 . Levels of diversification, financing constraints, and operating leverage by industry-size-ranked portfolios. These graphs depict the mean and median levels of diversification, financing constraints, and operating leverage against size-ranked portfolios of firms within the industry. Size portfolios are constructed by ranking firms in each industry and year based on their market values of equity at the beginning of the year. Portfolio 1 (4) includes all firms in the bottom (top) quartile of market value of equity in each industry and year. Diversification is defined as the number of business segments in which the firm operates. Financing constraints are constructed following the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) financing constraint index. Operating leverage is defined as the percentage change in operating income for a percentage change in sales revenue and is obtained in two steps. First, I run yearly firm-specific regressions of operating income after depreciation on sales using the last 10 years of observations. Second, I multiply the estimated firm-specific coefficients by the past 10-year mean of sales divided by the past 10-year mean of operating income to obtain the operating leverage measure. I use the lagged sensitivity of operating income to sales as a proxy for operating leverage.
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performance than industry-only and S&P 500 peer groups. In addition, below I discuss tests of RPE when peers are formed on industry and other firm characteristics.
Empirical model
I estimate the following model:
(1)
The subscript t indicates time in years and the subscript i indicates a CEO-firm pair. CEOPay it is a measure of the compensation of the CEO. FirmPerf it and PeerPerf it are performance measures for firm i and its peer group, respectively. Control variables capture variation in CEO pay that is not related to firm or industry performance. These variables are discussed in Section 4.
The basic test of RPE is H 0 : a 2 X0 against the alternative H A : a 2 o0. Rejecting the null hypothesis constitutes evidence that external shocks are filtered out from own-firm performance in compensation contracts. This test is also called a weakform test of RPE.
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Firm performance can be measured as the percentage change in firm value (i.e., stock return) or as the change in shareholder wealth (i.e., gross stock return multiplied by beginning-of-year market value). The choice depends on what drives CEO incentives. Hall and Liebman (1998) and Baker and Hall (2004) argue that if CEO incentives increase with CEO dollar ownership, then compensation should be specified as a function of stock returns. If, instead, CEO incentives are driven by the CEO's fraction of stock ownership, then performance should be specified in dollar terms. Without favoring any of the specifications, Hall and Liebman (1998) conclude that CEO wealth constraints imply that even small fractional ownership can provide large incentives. I use both in my tests. When the model is specified with stock returns as the performance measure (levels regression), I regress the logarithm of the level of total compensation on stock returns and the other independent variables. When the model is specified with the change in the logarithm of shareholder wealth as the performance measure (changes regression), I difference both left-and right-hand-side variables and regress the change in the logarithm of total compensation on the firm's stock return and on the other independent variables also expressed as changes (see Murphy, 1999 , for the algebra of this transformation). When the independent variables have little or no timeseries variation, I include them in levels.
Data
Standard & Poor's ExecuComp database provides annual CEO compensation as reported by firms in their proxy statements. Financial data are from Compustat. Stock return data are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Price (CRSP) monthly stock files, and inflation data are obtained from CRSP-Indexes-US Treasury and Inflation.
The initial dataset from ExecuComp has approximately 23,000 firm-CEO-year observations for 1992-2005. I delete observations for which there is more than one CEO per firm and year or when the CEO was in the firm for less than a full year. I also drop observations with missing or nonpositive values for total compensation, sales, market value, and common equity. In addition, I exclude observations with no industry classification, stock returns, governance measures, or idiosyncratic variance. Table 2 shows that the final sample contains approximately 16,000 CEO-year observations for 2,374 firms.
CEO compensation is defined as the total annual flow compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, long-term incentive payouts, restricted stock grants, Black and Scholes value of stock option grants, and all other compensation. I do not include in the measure of CEO compensation changes in the value of existing firm options and stock holdings owned by the CEO. The revaluation of these previously granted securities is mechanically related to the firm's own performance and is consequently independent of relative performance (see, e.g., Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a) .
12 I measure total annual compensation flow in real terms (base January 1992 for the consumer price index, CPI) and deflate compensation by the value of the CPI index of the fiscal month. Panel A of Table 3 presents summary statistics for the measures of compensation. The average (median) CEO receives a real total annual compensation flow of $3.36 million ($1.61 million). I use the logarithm of real total annual compensation flow in the empirical analysis. This mitigates heteroskedasticity resulting from extreme skewness and facilitates comparison of results with previous studies (Murphy, 1999) .
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11 An alternative test of RPE uses the ratio a 2 =a 1 as opposed to a 2 alone. This alternative test takes into consideration the correlation between firm and peer group performance, which can lead to the insignificance of a 2 and to an improper rejection of the alternative hypothesis. However, one potential problem of the alternative testing procedure is that a 1 could be zero, leading to a misspecified test. Untabulated results show that tests using the ratio a 2 =a 1 yield qualitatively similar results to those using a 2 .
12 Excluding the revaluation of firm stock options and stock holdings owned by the CEO is likely to bias the estimated own-firm performance sensitivity ða 1 Þ downward.
I measure annual firm performance using both stock returns and return on assets (ROA). The mean real stock return is 7.3% and the mean real ROA is 2.2% (see Panel B of Table 3 ). Following Lambert and Larcker (1987) , Barro and Barro (1990) , and Sloan (1993) , I use changes in ROA to better approximate the news in the series because ROA exhibits high persistence.
I construct portfolios to calculate peer returns matched on industry at the two-digit standard industry classification (SIC) level and firm size. 13 First, I form annual portfolios based on industry codes using all the firms in the merged CRSP-Compustat database. 14 Doing so ensures that relevant peers are included even if they are not in ExecuComp.
Second, within an industry, firms are sorted by beginning-of-year market value into size quartiles. 15 Third, I match each firm with an industry-size peer group that excludes the own firm and compute an equal-weighted portfolio return using the firm-specific peer group. Using value-weighted portfolio returns yields qualitatively similar results. I require a minimum of two firms per industry-size group to calculate its return. When the number of firms per industry-size group is less than two, to minimize loss of observations, the portfolio's return is based only on industry and no size portfolio is created. Requiring a minimum of three or five firms per industry-size group, as opposed to two, does not change the results qualitatively. I repeat this procedure for both ROA-and stock returns-based performance. The only difference in the portfolio formation when computing accounting versus stock returns of the peer group is that, in the former, I further require that firms be matched by fiscal year-end month. This is done to ensure that the timing of the performance measures is matched. This problem does not arise for stock returns as the monthly availability of stock return data allows the construction of annual peer group stock returns that exactly match the fiscal year-end month of each firm. Following the literature, I control for firm size (Smith and Watts, 1992; Rosen, 1982) , growth opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992; Core and Guay, 1999) , CEO tenure (Himmelberg and Hubbard, 2000; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 ), firmspecific stock return variance as a proxy for operating or informational environment risk Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a) , and several measures of corporate governance . Albuquerque (2006) contains a more detailed justification for using these controls. Appendix B provides a detailed explanation of how the variables are constructed.
In addition to these controls, I include year dummies to capture year-specific differences in the level of compensation, for example, due to business cycles or trends in pay (Murphy, 1999) , and industry dummies to account for unobservable variation in the industry level of pay, for example, due to variation in the demand for managerial talent across industries 14 To mitigate the impact of outliers I exclude firms with assets less than $10 million. 15 Lys and Sabino (1992) demonstrate that grouping firms by placing 27% of the sample on each of the extreme portfolios produces the most powerful tests. This motivated the selection of quartiles (25% of observations within an industry) to form the industry-size groupings. (Murphy, 1999) . I further control for CEO-fixed effects in the level of CEO pay to capture differences in CEO pay that result from unobservable CEO characteristics such as risk aversion.
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Panel C of Table 3 reports the slope coefficient, r, from a pooled regression of firm performance on peer performance. According to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) , peer performance measures with higher r constitute better filters for external shocks. When peers are defined as the firms in the same industry-size group, r equals 0.78. When peers are defined as the firms in the same industry group, r equals 0.74 (the difference in r's is statistically significant at the 1% level). Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the independent variables. As expected, firm stock returns and changes in ROA display a positive correlation of 0.23. The correlation of firm stock returns with its industry peer is 0.43, lower than the correlation of firm stock returns with its industry-size peer of 0.45. A test of significance of the difference in correlation coefficients (see Cohen and Cohen, 1983 ) yields a p-value of 0.02. As with r above, this is indicative of the ability of sizebased peer groups to better filter noise in firm performance measures.
Results
In this section, I present the main results of the paper. First, I show that measuring peer performance based on industrysize groups improves the ability to detect firm usage of RPE in contrast to industry or S&P 500 peer groups. Second, the inclusion of accounting performance measures in total compensation does not remove the significance of RPE.
Peer groups and RPE in stock returns
In this subsection, I test for the presence of RPE in CEO compensation using alternative peer groups (S&P 500 index, industry, and industry-size peers) in stock returns as performance measures. The results are presented in Table 5 . Panel A shows the estimation of the levels regression using CEO-fixed effects, and Panel B shows the estimation of the changes regression without CEO-fixed effects.
In Panel A, the coefficient on firm stock performance is positive and statistically significant for each specification with coefficients ranging from 0.21 to 0.24, consistent with CEOs being rewarded for positive firm stock performance. When the peer group consists of the firms in the S&P 500 index, RPE is not rejected as the coefficient on the peer portfolio is negative and significantly different from zero (coefficient of À0:25, and p-value of 0.06). When the peer group is defined as those firms in the same industry, RPE is again not rejected (coefficient of À0:06, and p-value of 0.07). However, when the peer group is defined as those firms in the same industry and size group, the results suggest that external shocks are better filtered through these industry-size groups than with industry groups only. The coefficient on the industry-size peer group is more negative (coefficient of À0:13, and p-value of 0.00). To further test the marginal contribution of each peer group in filtering external shocks from the level of CEO pay, I simultaneously include the S&P 500 index, the industry, and the industry-size peer groups in the level of CEO pay regression. The results in column (4) suggest that common uncertainties are filtered out of executive compensation only through the industry-size peer group (coefficient of À0:29, and p-value of 0.00). The coefficient on the S&P 500 peer group is insignificant (coefficient of À0:20, and p-value of 0.14), and the coefficient on the industry peer group exhibits the opposite sign to that predicted by RPE (coefficient of 0.20, and p-value of 0.00). These results indicate that the level of CEO pay increases with industry stock performance, but that common shocks within the same industry-size portfolio are filtered out from the level of CEO compensation.
Panel B of Table 5 shows the results for the changes regressions. CEO pay growth is tightly linked to firm stock performance (coefficients ranging from 0.37 to 0.39 with p-values of 0.00). Column (1) shows that the coefficient associated with the S&P 500 index return is not statistically significant, suggesting that aggregate market movements are not filtered out from CEO pay growth. Likewise, when the peer group consists of firms in the same industry [column (2)], the performance of these peer firms does not seem to be filtered out from CEO pay growth. In column (3), the peer group is represented by those firms in the same industry and size quartile as that of the firm. The coefficient on this peer group stock return is À0:10 and statistically significant (p-value of 0.02), providing evidence that the stock return performance of peers is filtered out from the growth in CEO pay as predicted by RPE. Column (4) presents the results when all the abovementioned peer groups are simultaneously included in the regression model. The results show that CEO pay growth increases with industry stock performance (coefficient of 0.24, and p-value of 0.00) and that it decreases with the stock performance of other companies in the same industry and size quartile (coefficient of À0:28, and p-value of 0.00). Overall, the results in the changes regressions suggest that evidence of RPE is observed only using industry-size peers, highlighting the importance of the size breakdown and reinforcing the results obtained in the levels regressions.
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The coefficient on industry peer performance switches from negative and statistically significant when included as the sole peer performance measure to positive and statistically significant when the performance of the industry-size peers is
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16 The Black and Scholes value of stock option grants can overestimate the option value for undiversified, risk-averse executives Murphy, 2000, 2002; . Given that both risk aversion and the level of diversification are likely to be CEO-specific, different CEOs might evaluate the same options differently. The CEO-fixed effect can thus capture differences in the valuation of these options by CEOs.
17 I estimate the same regression model using median regressions to mitigate the impact of outliers. The untabulated results are qualitatively similar.
also included. A possible explanation for the sign switch of the industry peer performance coefficient is that industry peer performance, when used as the sole measure of peer performance, is capturing two effects. One of the effects is that of RPE: if industry peer performance is used as a filter for external shocks, then its coefficient in the regression should be negative. The other effect is that industry peer performance captures shocks to demand for managerial talent that drive up CEO pay (see Himmelberg and Hubbard, 2000; Oyer, 2004) : its coefficient should therefore be positive. If industry-size peer performance is a better proxy to filter external shocks, the inclusion of both industry only peer performance and industrysize peer performance would cause the industry peer performance variable to capture the effect that the demand for managerial talent has on CEO pay. Regarding the impact of the control variables on the level of CEO pay, and consistent with the previous literature, I show in Panel A that CEOs of larger firms, with longer tenure, more growth options, and more idiosyncratic variance are paid more. Year Dummies (untabulated) are statistically significant at common levels and are consistent with the fact that the level of real pay has increased over the sample period (see also Murphy, 1999) . The governance variables are statistically insignificant as a consequence of the high correlation between CEO-fixed effects and firm characteristics that are quasifixed over the tenure of the CEO. 18 The regulation dummy switches signs across regression specifications, but in median regressions the sign is always negative so that CEOs of firms in nonregulated industries receive higher total compensation. The impact of the control variables in the growth of CEO pay is shown in Panel B. The results indicate that CEO pay growth is higher for firms that increase growth options, for less experienced CEOs, and for firms with boards that meet more frequently. Next, I evaluate the economic significance of RPE by calculating the change in total compensation that occurs when peer performance, measured as industry-size peer performance, changes by one standard deviation, while keeping all else equal. In this scenario, the peers are doing well (or poorly) overall and firm performance exhibits no change. I use the results from column (4) in Panel A, due to the slightly higher explanatory power of this model. One standard deviation of peer performance is 25.6% per year (see Table 3 ) and represents a typical shock to peer performance. 19 An increase (decrease) in peer performance of 0.256 leads to a 7.4% (equal to À0:29 Â 0:256) decrease (increase) in total CEO compensation, all else equal. This is equivalent to a mean decrease in real CEO pay of $249,372 (equal to 7:4% Â $3:36 million).
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The results in Table 5 are based on regressions with pooled time-series and cross-sectional data that assume constant regression coefficients across time and firms. While this is the common approach in the literature, one could argue that industry-size peer portfolios appear successful because they proxy for differential RPE coefficients across firms or over time. 21 To address the concern that RPE coefficients can vary across firms, I reestimate model (1) using firm-specific regressions for firms with more than 10 observations. As a result of this data requirement, the sample of firms used in this analysis is reduced to approximately 780 firms (representing 33% of the number of firms in the full sample). 22 To conserve degrees of freedom, I drop the control variables and include only a constant and the firm performance and peer performance variables in the regression. Many controls are constant over time, or almost constant, for each firm and dropping them does not affect the estimation. The small sample in each regression (minimum of 10 observations per regression per firm and a maximum of 14 observations per regression per firm) lowers the power to reject the null hypothesis when it is false. The problem is that the null of no RPE may not be rejected often enough. After all, this is why pooled regressions are used. Therefore, if, in spite of the small sample issue, I still find evidence that industry-size peers act as filters for exogenous shocks (rejecting the null hypothesis of no RPE), then this finding constitutes strong evidence in favor of RPE. Table 6 presents the mean and median of the estimated coefficients on firm and peer performance across the firmspecific regressions as well as the mean R 2 across the regressions. Table 6 also presents the results on the hypothesis test that the mean coefficient is zero. The results for the levels regressions are reported in Panel A, and the results for the changes regressions are reported in Panel B. Panel A shows that the mean estimated coefficient on the industry-size peer is À0:18 and statistically significant (t-statistic of À3:02). The mean estimated coefficient on the industry peer group is not statistically significant. These results show a bigger discrepancy between industry-only and industry-size peers in the firmspecific regressions than in the pooled regressions, confirming the result that industry-size peers are better filters for external shocks. The results for the changes regressions show that both the industry peer performance and industry-size peer performance are filtered out from the growth of CEO pay. The mean coefficient is slightly higher when using industry-size peers than when using industry peers only. The results when the peer group is the S&P 500 firms mimic those in Table 5 . Panels C and D of Table 6 allow for all peer groups to potentially act as filters of exogenous shocks from the level and growth of CEO pay, respectively. The regressions in these panels allow different firms to have different sensitivities to different peer performance. For example, the board of directors of a well-diversified firm may find it more appropriate to benchmark the firm's stock performance against the S&P 500 index than against an industry-size grouping, as it can be hard to define the industry to which this firm belongs. The results are similar to those in Table 5 using pooled regressions. The mean coefficient on industry peer performance becomes positive (in both the levels and changes regressions) but is significant only in the levels regressions. The change in sign on industry performance mirrors the result in the pooled regressions. The mean coefficient on industry-size peer performance remains negative and significant in both the levels
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18 The regressions without CEO-fixed effects show that, consistent with evidence in Core et al. (1999) , CEOs who are board chairs and have low equity ownership are more highly compensated. I also find that boards that meet relatively less frequently and CEOs with an interlock relationship are compensated less, which is inconsistent with an entrenchment story. 19 Assuming that peer performance follows a normal distribution, then a one standard deviation shock (up and down) around the mean corresponds to about 68% of all observations. 20 This lower compensation does not lead to a violation of the CEO's participation constraint in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) because the firm is required to meet only an ex ante participation constraint, which implies that, ex post, the wage paid to the CEO can be lower than his outside opportunity. 21 I thank the Editor for making this point. 22 These firms are on average larger than in the full sample (the mean real market value and sales of firms in the reduced sample is $6.65 billion and $4.38 billion, respectively, versus $4.71 billion and $3.28 billion, respectively, in the full sample). I reestimate the regressions presented in Table 5 for a subsample of firms whose firm size is below the median firm size within each industry. The untabulated results (available upon request) are similar to those for the full sample.
and changes regressions. The results using S&P 500 peer firms show that shocks affecting S&P 500 firms are filtered out from the level of CEO pay, but not from the growth in CEO pay as before.
Although not reported, I also estimate the firm-specific regressions including firm size and growth options as controls in the levels regressions and changes in growth options in the changes regressions. The results that replicate Panels A and B, in which only one peer portfolio is used at a time, are very similar. The results that replicate Panels C and D, in which all peer portfolios are used simultaneously, differ significantly. When the additional controls are included in the regressions only the firm-specific return and the industry-size peer return are significant. In the levels (changes) regression, the mean 
PeerPerf it þ u it by firm. Panel A presents summary statistics for the estimated regression coefficients of the natural logarithm of real total CEO compensation on firm stock performance and peer group stock performance. Panel B presents summary statistics for the estimated regression coefficients of the percentage change of real total CEO compensation on firm stock performance and peer group stock performance. Panels C and D present the results from regressing the natural logarithm and percentage change of total flow compensation, respectively, on firm stock performance and on the performance of the S&P 500, industry, and industry-size peer groups simultaneously. Variables are defined in Appendix B. The sample is drawn from the ExecuComp database for the years 1992-2005 merged with Compustat and CRSP data.
coefficient on firm stock return is 0.38 (0.57) with a t-statistic of 6.20 (6.32) and the coefficient on peer performance is À0:42 ðÀ0:62Þ with a t-statistic of 3.84 (2.96).
To address the concern that the coefficients on peer performance may not be constant over time, I reestimate the pooled regressions used in Table 5 adding two interaction variables to capture whether the coefficients on firm and peer performance are different in the second half of the sample (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) versus those in the first half of the sample (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) . The untabulated results show that the results presented in Table 5 remain qualitatively the same. The coefficient on the interaction between firm performance and a dummy variable for the second half of the sample is insignificant, as is the coefficient on the interaction between peer performance and the same dummy variable. I also run Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. If the true coefficients are not on average negative over time, then I would expect to reject RPE using this method. The results (untabulated) also support the industry-size peer group definition. Sloan (1993) argues that accounting measures can be viewed as substitutes to RPE, and vice versa, because the information value of accounting earnings helps filter out the noise in firm stock returns. Hence, ROA can be a useful measure of firm performance, but it can also be a substitute for RPE. As Bushman and Smith (2001) point out, if the signal value of ROA is dominated by the noise filtering effect of ROA, then ROA would receive a negative weight. In this subsection, I include both stock returns and ROA as signals of firm performance and test for RPE in both stock returns and accounting returns. First, I test the informativeness of changes in ROA versus stock returns.
Accounting returns and RPE
23 Second, I test whether RPE using stock returns survives the inclusion of the ROA signal. Third, I test for RPE in ROA. Panel A of Table 7 presents the results using the levels regression, and Panel B presents the results using the changes regression. First, ROA is not additionally informative of CEO actions both in the levels and changes regressions. Moreover, the magnitude and significance of the coefficients associated with own-firm stock returns do not change significantly after including ROA. This evidence is consistent with , who find that, for most CEOs, stock returns are the dominant component of their incentive packages (see also Baber et al., 1996; Leone et al., 2006) . Second, controlling for ROA does not decrease the significance of RPE in stock returns when peer groups are defined by industry-size in both the levels and changes regressions. The results for industry peers remain similar to those in Table 5 , showing no statistical significance in the changes regression.
Third, I find no evidence of RPE in ROA for any peer group definition. In fact, the coefficient on the industry or industrysize peer ROA is positive and statistically significant for both the levels and changes regressions. Moreover, in unreported results, I find that the absence of evidence supporting RPE in ROA holds whether stock returns are included in the compensation regressions or not. These results are consistent with the evidence in Gibbons and Murphy (1990) , who test RPE using ROA, and Janakiraman et al. (1992) , who test RPE using return on equity (ROE). The lack of RPE in ROA could be due to two reasons. First, accounting returns are a less noisy measure of performance, thus mitigating the need for RPE in this measure. ROA numbers are based on conservatism and thus already remove some common shocks by not recognizing unrealized gains. Second, accounting data are available only at an annual or quarterly frequency, with a substantial lag, which precludes firms from using accounting returns to evaluate the performance of CEOs.
Asymmetric use of RPE
The evidence of RPE in CEO turnover contrasts with prior evidence on the lack of RPE usage in CEO compensation and suggests that RPE can be used more in poor firm performance years. This raises the question of whether the success of the industry-size peer performance comes from being a good filter during periods of poor firm performance only. One possible reason for such an asymmetry is the board's concern with a higher probability of shareholder litigation when the firm performs poorly not only in absolute terms but also relative to its peers. For example, in February 2005, a shareholder lawsuit was filed against Abercrombie & Fitch Co. alleging that the company's poor performance compared with other retailers did not justify the amount of CEO compensation. In this subsection, I test whether the use of RPE is asymmetric in CEO pay.
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A firm is said to have performed poorly if its yearly return was among the bottom quartile of returns across all firms in ExecuComp. These constitute periods of significant poorer performance, which I label as poor performance years. I construct a dummy variable that equals one during poor performance periods and zero otherwise. To test for an asymmetric use of RPE, I interact this dummy variable with firm and peer stock returns. If RPE is used asymmetrically, I expect to find a negative coefficient associated with the dummy for poor performance interacted with peer stock returns.
The results are reported in Table 8 . First, the sensitivity of compensation to peer stock performance remains significantly negative, regardless of how compensation is measured. The coefficient (p-value) on peer performance during normal
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23 For advantages and disadvantages to using either stock returns or earnings-based measures as performance signals, see Sloan (1993) , Watts (2003a, b) , Leone et al. (2006) , and Lambert and Larcker (1987) . 24 Garvey and Milbourn (2006) show an asymmetric effect in RPE usage in CEO pay. However, Garvey and Milbourn suggest that RPE usage varies with good and bad market or industry performance, in contrast to good and bad firm performance as I do in this paper. Their hypothesis is that weak governance structures imply that RPE is used only when it is in the interest of the CEO to do so, that is, when the market overall displays negative returns.
performance periods is À0:15 (0.00) for the level of compensation and À0:14 (0.01) for the change in compensation. Hence, I cannot reject that industry-size peer performance is a good filter during normal performance periods. Second, the marginal effect from poor performance periods on peer-performance sensitivity is not statistically significant. This result suggests that the level of RPE during poor performance periods is not different from the level of RPE used at other times.
A strong-form RPE test
In this subsection, I test whether the optimal level of RPE is used as suggested by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) . This is called a test of the strong-form RPE (e.g., Antle and Smith, 1986; Janakiraman et al., 1992) . Finding evidence that 
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Panel A presents the results from regressing the natural logarithm of real total CEO compensation on firm performance [measured by the natural logarithm of real annual stock returns including dividends and by the firm percentage change in real return on assets (income before extraordinary items/ beginning-of-year total assets)], peer group performance (defined as the natural logarithm of real annual stock returns, excluding own-firm performance, and as the percentage change in return on assets of the corresponding peer group, also excluding own-firm performance), and control variables. some noise is removed from compensation, as I do above, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to find evidence of strong-form RPE. In Holmstrom and Milgrom, the optimal amount of RPE suggests that CEOs should be compensated only for unsystematic firm performance. Unsystematic firm performance is firm performance that is unrelated to peer performance and can be estimated as the residual in the regression of firm performance on a constant and on peer performance:
A test of the strong-form RPE, first proposed by Antle and Smith (1986) (see Appendix A), amounts to estimating a modified version of Eq. (1),
where SystFirmPerf it ¼ĝ þrPeerPerf it (4) and testing whether d 2 ¼ 0. If the optimal amount of noise is filtered in CEO pay and d 2 ¼ 0, then CEOs are not compensated by performance that appears to be exogenous to the firm. This test is implemented in two steps. First, I estimate a pooled regression of firm performance on a constant and on peer performance. The estimates,ĝ andr, are then used to construct estimates of unsystematic and systematic firm performance. Second, I estimate model (3), including both unsystematic and systematic stock returns and accounting returns. Table 9 presents the results of the test H 0 : d 2 ¼ 0 against the alternative H A : d 2 a0. Panel A shows that H 0 cannot be rejected at common significance levels in the levels regressions (d 2 is 0.03 with a p-value of 0.32). This evidence provides support for the hypothesis that the optimal amount of noise in stock returns is filtered and that CEOs are not compensated for systematic performance when peers are defined by the firms in the same industry and size quartile. No support is found for the strong-form RPE in either stock returns or accounting returns when industry peers are used. 
In testing for an asymmetric use of RPE, I include two interaction variables that result from the product of a dummy variable (that equals one if the firm exhibits poor performance and zero otherwise) with the firms' stock returns and the peers' stock returns. A firm is said to have performed poorly if its yearly return was among the bottom 25% lowest returns across all firms for the year. 
Peer groups based on other firm characteristics
The success of industry-size peers in identifying RPE peers is subject to the concern that other firm characteristics could better proxy for external shocks. I replicate the regressions in Tables 5 and 7 using peers defined by industry-diversification, industry-financing constraints, and industry-operating leverage (as suggested by the discussion in Section 2.2). The results (untabulated) show no evidence of RPE in either the levels or the changes regressions when each of these peers is used, except in the levels regression using the industry-diversification peers.
Another candidate method to form peers is using a firm's level of growth options. Firms with different growth options can face similar shocks or similar costs in responding to external shocks in a way that is not captured by differences in firm size. For example, exogenous shocks to interest rates can change the value of high-growth options firms differently than the value of low-growth options firms.
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To analyze the role of growth options versus that of firm size in constructing peer groups, I create portfolios of firms based on industry and growth options quartiles following the same procedure used for industry-size portfolios. I also create portfolios of firms based on industry and growth options-size quartiles. The latter portfolios were created by ranking the firms in each industry and year into two growth options portfolios and two other independent size portfolios. The result is four portfolios of firms in each industry per year. I then reestimate the compensation models using as peer performance the average returns of these peer groups. Table 10 presents the results. Using industry-growth options peers, RPE is not rejected in the level of CEO pay (coefficient of À0:13, and p-value of 0.00), but it is rejected in the growth of CEO pay (coefficient of À0:04, and p-value of 0.29). However, when the performance of industry-growth options peers and that of industry-size peers are both included in the regressions, evidence shows that shocks are filtered through industry-size peer performance only in both the level and growth of CEO pay. The industry-size portfolios appear to filter information that subsumes the information filtered through industry-growth options portfolios. Evidence exists of RPE in the level and growth of CEO pay when peers are defined as the firms in the same industry-size-growth options group. 25 In untabulated results, I find no evidence consistent with strong-from RPE when the peer group is defined as the S&P 500 index. 26 In the dividend discount model, the intrinsic value of a firm with dividends D, growth g, and discount rate r is V ¼ D=ðr À gÞ. The sensitivity of firm value to r is @V=@r ¼ ÀD=ðr À gÞ 2 , which is larger if g is larger.
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Conclusion
Despite the theoretical motivation for the use of RPE in setting CEO compensation, extant empirical evidence supporting RPE is mixed. This paper contributes to the literature by showing that previous failures to detect RPE can be attributed to the choice of the peer group. An important consideration in identifying peer groups within an industry is a firm's size because both the type of shocks and a firm's ability to respond to shocks are functions of firm size. Using industry-size peer groups and ExecuComp data, I find consistent evidence of RPE in the level and change of CEO pay when performance is measured by stock returns. This stands in contrast with previous papers using ExecuComp data. I find no evidence of RPE when performance is measured using accounting returns.
While industry-size peers is a simple and convenient way of identifying peers, as it allows for more powerful tests of RPE, it is certainly not the only way. For example, geographic location is an important criterion when defining peer firms for banks and utilities. Canandaigua National Bank & Trust National considers other local banks as competitors (e.g., Bank of Geneva) but does not view banks located in Texas as competitors even if they are similar in size. An interesting topic for future research is the development of theories that optimally define firm-specific peer groups allowing empiricists to perform more powerful tests. Panel A presents the results of regressing the natural logarithm of real total CEO compensation on a set of variable using CEO-fixed effects. Panel B presents the results from regressing the percentage change of real total CEO compensation without CEO-fixed effects. In each panel, the respective compensation component is regressed on firm performance, peer group performance, and some control variables. Refer to previous tables for a description of the control variables included (but not shown) in the regression. Variables are defined in Appendix B. The (1) columns use as peer returns the average return on a portfolio of firms within the same two-digit SIC and size quartile. The (2) columns use as peer returns the average return on a portfolio of firms within the same two-digit SIC and growth quartile. The (3) columns use as peer returns, the average return on a portfolio of firms in the same two-digit SIC and size-growth quartile. The (4) columns use both peer returns, the average return on a portfolio of firms in the same two-digit SIC and Size quartile, and the average return on a portfolio of firms in the same two-digit SIC and growth quartile simultaneously. All dollar values are in thousands (compensation) or millions (firm characteristics) of constant 1992 dollars. p-Values are reported in parentheses beneath each coefficient estimate. Bold coefficients are significant at least at the 10% significance level. The standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent using the Huber-White correction and are clustered by firm. The sample is drawn from the ExecuComp database for the years 1992-2005 merged with Compustat and CRSP data.
Peer return (industry): The equal-weighted stock return portfolio of the peer firms in the same two-digit SIC code, excluding the own-firm stock return.
Change in firm ROA: ROA is calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus annual income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year total assets, both adjusted for inflation.
Change in peer ROA (industry-size): The equal-weighted change in ROA portfolio of the peer firms in the same two-digit SIC code and size quartile, excluding the own firm.
Change in peer ROA (Industry): The equal-weighted change in ROA portfolio of the peer firms in the same two-digit SIC code, excluding the own firm.
Firm size: The natural logarithm of sales, using constant 1992 dollars. I use beginning-of-year values for firm size (and for growth options). This assumes that the parameters of the compensation package are set at the beginning of the year and helps control for the fact that these firm characteristics may not be exogenous variables, but choice variables of the CEO.
Growth options: The beginning-of-year ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of assets. The market value of the firm is the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Firm market value of equity is calculated as number of shares outstanding multiplied by the closing price at fiscal year-end.
Regulation dummy: Variable equal to one for firms in the gas and electric industries with SIC codes from 4900 to 4939 and zero otherwise.
CEO tenure: The natural logarithm of CEO tenure. Tenure is calculated as the difference between the year and month in which the CEO assumed office (obtained from the variable BECAMECEO, from ExecuComp) and the year and month of the current fiscal year for which the CEO is still in office. I use the log of CEO tenure to account for a possible concave relation between experience, as measured by tenure in the firm, and the level of pay.
Idiosyncratic variance: The firm-specific stock return variance measured relative to the industry's variance, calculate over the previous 36 months.
B.3. Corporate governance variables
For all measures, a high number means greater potential agency conflicts and, presumably, a weaker governance structure.
CEO chair dummy: A dummy that equals one if the CEO is the board chair, as identified by searching the CEO's title and zero otherwise.
Number of meetings dummy: A dummy that takes the value of one if the number of board of directors' meetings held during the year is less than the overall sample median of meetings for that year and zero otherwise.
CEO ownership dummy: A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the CEO ownership share is lower than the median for the year across CEOs in the sample and zero otherwise. The percentage of CEO ownership is calculated as the number of shares (excluding options) owned by the CEO divided by the number of common shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year.
Interlock dummy: A dummy that takes the value of one if the CEO is involved in an interlock relationship requiring disclosure in the proxy statement and zero otherwise. ExecuComp defines an executive as having an interlock relationship if the executive serves on the board committee that makes his compensation decisions or if he serves on the board (and possibly compensation committee) of a company managed by an officer on the compensation committee of the indicated executive.
